14 June: Lecture, Monday 3pm -- Does a Rock Implement Every Computation?

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UCD Cognitive Science Programme Seminar Series

Lecture Theatre
Computer Science Building
Monday 3-4 pm
18 June, 2001

Does a Rock Implement Every Computation?

David J. Chalmers

Computationalism about the mind holds that cognitive processes are
grounded in computations implemented in the brain, and that
implementation of the appropriate computation suffices for a given
cognitive process. Some philosophers (e.g. Putnam and Searle) have
argued that computationalism must be false, as every ordinary open
physical system implements every computation (e.g. every finite-state
automaton). I argue that these arguments fail, but that they point
out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the
theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation
of implementation. They also raises questions about the classes of
automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the mind. I
develop an account of implementation, linked to an appropriate class
of automata, such that the requirement that a system implement a given
automaton places a very strong constraint on the system. This clears
the way for computation to play a central role in the analysis of
cognition.

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